Seas under tension, closed sky: Ormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Dubai at the heart of the trade crisis

In the north, the Strait of Ormuz concentrates nearly 20% of world oil consumption, in a corridor that is now partially paralyzed by the attacks and explicit threats of revolutionaries. To the south, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is a compulsory passage between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, has 10-12 per cent of international maritime trade, from crude to containers. Between these two gulets, it is the entire Asia-Europe-Americas road that is faltering, caught in a continuum of military, terrorist and geopolitical risks.

The American-Israeli operations against Iran, followed by reprisals from Tehran, have already led to ship attacks and the halting of certain flows around the Gulf, transforming the area into a high-voltage maritime corridor. In the Red Sea, the Huthis militia, supported by Iran, extended the battlefield by targeting cargo and oil tankers, making Bab el-Mandeb a « High-risk area » officially identified by marine insurers.​​

While Iran accounts for only about 4.5% of the world's oil supply, the real vulnerability lies in the transit of black gold and LNG through Ormuz. In 2023, about 8.6 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined products were still passed by Bab el-Mandeb; This volume has already fallen by more than 50% in 2024 as a result of the Huthies attacks and detours imposed by the shipowners. The present war amplifies this movement of withdrawal of the most exposed roads, at the risk of a shock of supply if the blockade continues.

It should be noted that at the opening of the stock exchange on Monday, the Brent and the WTI received a GAP of nearly 13%.

Beyond crude oil, one third of the world's fertilizers (including sulphur and ammonia) usually transit through Ormuz, with no real credible terrestrial alternative due to limited pipeline and road transport capacity. The region is also a hub for petrochemicals: plastics, derivatives, intermediate products whose value chains irrigate the world industry are exposed to the slightest closure or the smallest increase in insurance. Each day of the blockage thus pushes back, a little more, the prospect of simple tensions towards that of a supply crisis.​

Bab el-Mandeb is not only a point on the map, it is a multiplier of risks: political instability in Yemen, military bases of major powers in Djibouti, persistent piracy off Somalia, drones and missiles attacks against civilian ships. Cargoers who choose to pass must deal with an incident risk greater than 1% by crossing without escort, a level deemed unacceptable by many operators.

As a result, the temptation grew to bypass Africa through the Cape of Good Hope, at a price of 10 to 15 additional days of navigation and a fuel bill rising sharply.

Impacts are cascading: delivery delays for Asia-Europe flows, insurance increases « war zone »increased exposure of perishable products to the risk of pure and simple loss. Against the background, the relative shortage of ships and crews ready to accept these high-voltage roads increases the pressure on freight rates, already volatile since previous health and geopolitical crises.

The crisis is also food: the Middle East, structurally dependent on imports of cereals, oilseeds and rice, sees its supply flows threatened by the disruption of maritime routes. Iran imports massively Brazilian maize, while the United Arab Emirates has purchased $1.5 billion in agricultural production in the United States, a large part of which is through or near Ormuz. Any prolonged interruption would increase the vulnerability of an already high socio-economic stressed region.​

The flow of manufactured goods (electronics, spare parts, vehicles, textiles) that travel through the Red Sea to connect Asia with Europe is not spared. Some of the technological components and strategic intermediate goods are now blocked in stationary vessels, or returned to longer routes, at the risk of creating bottlenecks in certain European and African industries. With each incident in the Strait, global markets overreact, revealing the extreme dependence of value chains on these narrow corridors.

Faced with this accumulation of risks, the large shipowners (Maersk, CMA CGM...) have already begun freezing their passages through Ormuz and limiting those by Suez, favoring the long bypass roads. Maritime insurers, on the other hand, reclassify these straits into high-risk areas, increase premiums, or simply withdraw coverage from certain sections. In this context, the decision whether or not to move through these corridors is no longer only commercial but becomes a strategic trade-off between cost, time and security.